Gaps in health security related to wildlife and environment affecting pandemic prevention and preparedness, 2007-2020.

OBJECTIVE: To describe and quantify the extent of wildlife and environment sector inclusion in country evaluation and prioritization tools for health security, and to provide practical recommendations for global and national action to improve pandemic prevention and preparedness. METHODS: To assess coverage of wildlife and other environmental aspects, we reviewed major health security reports (including World Organisation for Animal Health Performance of Veterinary Services reports, and World Health Organization Joint External Evaluations and follow-on National Action Plans for Health Security) published by 107 countries and territories. We extracted information on stated coverage gaps, wildlife surveillance systems and priority diseases. We also searched National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans published by 125 countries to assess whether disease surveillance or prevention activities were included. FINDINGS: We noted that the occurrence frequency of keywords indicative of wildlife, environment, biodiversity and climate factors varied with type of report and between countries. We found that more than half (57.9%, 62/107) of the reporting countries did not provide any evidence of a functional wildlife health surveillance programme. Most countries (83.2%, 89/107) indicated specific gaps in operations, coordination, scope or capacity. Only eight of the 125 countries (6.4%) publishing a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan reported tangible activities related to wildlife health or zoonotic disease. CONCLUSION: Overall, despite their importance for pandemic prevention, wildlife and environmental considerations are neglected in health security priorities and plans. Strengthening wildlife health capacity and operations should be emphasized in One Health efforts to monitor and mitigate known and novel disease risks.

The Berlin principles on one health - Bridging global health and conservation.

For over 15-years, proponents of the One Health approach have worked to consistently interweave components that should never have been separated and now more than ever need to be re-connected: the health of humans, non-human animals, and ecosystems. We have failed to heed the warning signs. A One Health approach is paramount in directing our future health in this acutely and irrevocably changed world. COVID-19 has shown us the exorbitant cost of inaction. The time to act is now.

Possibility for reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to free-ranging wildlife: A case study of bats.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the substantial public health, economic, and societal consequences of virus spillover from a wildlife reservoir. Widespread human transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) also presents a new set of challenges when considering viral spillover from people to naïve wildlife and other animal populations. The establishment of new wildlife reservoirs for SARS-CoV-2 would further complicate public health control measures and could lead to wildlife health and conservation impacts. Given the likely bat origin of SARS-CoV-2 and related beta-coronaviruses (ß-CoVs), free-ranging bats are a key group of concern for spillover from humans back to wildlife. Here, we review the diversity and natural host range of ß-CoVs in bats and examine the risk of humans inadvertently infecting free-ranging bats with SARS-CoV-2. Our review of the global distribution and host range of ß-CoV evolutionary lineages suggests that 40+ species of temperate-zone North American bats could be immunologically naïve and susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV-2. We highlight an urgent need to proactively connect the wellbeing of human and wildlife health during the current pandemic and to implement new tools to continue wildlife research while avoiding potentially severe health and conservation impacts of SARS-CoV-2 "spilling back" into free-ranging bat populations.